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The Transition to Electronic Communications
Networks in the Secondary Treasury Market 
Bruce Mizrach and Christopher J. Neely
The advantages of ECNs are most evident in the
markets for more liquid and homogenous assets.
In contrast, assets whose trading requires more
customization—that is, negotiation over quantities
and settlement details—will benefit from human
brokers. Barclay, Hendershott, and Kotz (2006)
discuss the conditions under which voice brokers
outperform ECNs in conveying complex infor-
mation (“market color”) during trading for less-
liquid assets or nonstandard instruments.
By dramatically reducing the cost of trading
for relatively liquid and homogeneous assets,
electronic trading has facilitated portfolio manage-
ment for institutional investors and banks. Rising
volume has mirrored the fall in the cost of trading,
enabling customers to rebalance portfolios more
quickly, making them less risky.
This article scrutinizes a previously unex-
amined data set, the U.S. Treasury bond market
data from the eSpeed ECN, founded by Cantor
Fitzgerald and Co. We have a complete record of
trades and quotes from eSpeed for 2004, and we
contrast the ECN market with similar 1999 data
from GovPX, a joint venture among voice brokers.
Compared with GovPX, eSpeed exhibits much
I
n the past 15 years, advances in informa-
tion technology have revolutionized elec-
tronic trading—posting quotes, transacting,
and confirming orders electronically. Elec-
tronic methods have grown to dominate trading
in major asset markets, such as equities, foreign
exchange, and most recently U.S. Treasuries.
The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) (2000) defines electronic communications
networks (ECNs) as “electronic trading systems
that automatically match buy and sell orders at
specified prices.”1 ECNs have several advantages
over other systems, such as open-outcry trading
floors or telephone trading. First, ECNs permit
users all over the world to trade, without regard
to physical location. Second, ECNs permit the
number of traders, the size of trades, or the asset
to vary costlessly. Third, ECNs automate the pro-
cessing and clearing of trading, reducing the risk
of clearing errors and facilitating risk management
(Bank for International Settlements [BIS], 2001).
This article reviews the history of the recent shift to electronic trading in equity, foreign exchange,
and fixed-income markets. The authors analyze a new data set: the eSpeed electronic Treasury net-
work. They contrast the market microstructure of the eSpeed trading platform with the traditional
voice-assisted networks that report through GovPX. The electronic market (eSpeed) has greater
volume, smaller spreads, and a lower estimated trade impact than the voice market (GovPX).
(JEL G14, G12, D4, C32)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, November/December 2006, 88(6), pp. 527-41.
1 One should not confuse ECNs, which offer firm prices and imme-
diate execution, with other forms of trading that use electronic
technology.
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         lower spreads and a smaller impact on prices
from order flow. A detailed understanding of
market microstructure can contribute to better reg-
ulation and improvements to market architecture.
STAGES OF THE TREASURY
BOND MARKET
The sale of Treasuries undergoes three distinct
phases: primary, on-the-run, and off-the-run.
Each of these three stages has a distinct market
structure.
The Primary Market
In the first or primary stage, the U.S. Treasury
auctions off debt to the public. Garbade and Ingber
(2005) describe this process in detail.2 The
Treasury provides a predictable flow of auction
information to “promote competitiveness by
enhancing market transparencies” and to improve
the size of offerings. Since August 8, 2002, the
Treasury has made auction announcements (for all
new securities) at 11:00 a.m. eastern time. There is
also a stable schedule3 for auctions. For example,
3- and 6-month bills are auctioned weekly; 2- and
5-year notes are auctioned monthly; 30-year bonds
were reintroduced on February 9, 2006, after a 5-
year hiatus, and are auctioned in February and
August each year.
A few days prior to the auction, the specific
dollar amount (par value) of the securities to be
auctioned is announced and the when-issued
security market begins. The when-issued market
continues until settlement of auction purchases.
Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) document that
when-issued trading provides important infor-
mation about auction prices prior to the auction
and also permits market participants to reduce
the risk they take in bidding.4
Bids for Treasury auctions can either be com-
petitive bids by primary dealers or noncompetitive
bids by firms and individuals. Firms and individ-
uals can also competitively bid through brokers
and primary dealers. Competitive bids specify a
price to be bid and a quantity sought. In the recent
past, there have been two types of auctions:
multiple-price and single-price.
Garbade and Ingber (2005) discuss the transi-
tion from multiple-price auctions to single-price
auctions. Historically (prior to 1992) multiple-
price auctions were used to sell Treasury securi-
ties. In multiple-price auctions, the competitive
bids were ranked to determine the highest yield
that will sell all the Treasuries. The average yield
for all accepted competitive bids is called the
stop-out yield. First, all noncompetitive bids are
satisfied at the stop-out yield and then the remain-
der of the auctioned securities are allocated to
competitive bidders with the lowest bid yield
(highest bid price). Competitive bids above the
stop-out yield are not filled, whereas those at the
stop-out yield may be only partially filled.
The Treasury began to experiment with single-
price auctions in 1992 for the 2- and 5-year notes
(Garbade and Ingber, 2005). In this auction design,
all securities are allocated to bidders at the price
implied by the highest accepted yield. In October
1998, the Treasury adopted this procedure for all
maturities, safeguarded by quantity restrictions
on the amount a single bidder can purchase.
Upon completion of the auction, the most
recently issued bill, note, or bond becomes on-
the-run and the previous on-the-run issue goes
off-the-run. Both on-the-run and off-the-run
trading occurs in the secondary Treasury market.
Secondary market participants are often divided
into two parts: the sell side and the buy side. The
primary securities dealers constitute the sell side,
while the diverse group of final users of Treasury
bonds constitutes the buy side. The buy side
includes commercial and investment banks,
insurance companies, financial firms, investors,
and pension funds—those who use Treasuries
for speculation, as well as for hedging real and
financial risk. 
Mizrach and Neely
528 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2006 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
2 See the glossary for definitions of terms.
3 The Treasury auction schedule can be found at: www.treasury.gov/
offices/domestic-finance/debt-management/auctions/.
4 On August 20, 1998, the Treasury shortened the when-issued period
for 13- and 26-week bill auctions. Similarly, the Treasury shortened
the when-issued period by two days for 2-year notes, beginning with
the August 2, 2002, auction. Fleming (2002) and Garbade and Ingber
(2005) discuss the results of such changes in when-issued periods.The Overall Secondary Market
It is difficult to get primary source data for all
secondary market transactions, therefore we will
use market-share5 estimates made by the Federal
Reserve and industry participants. Figure 1 shows
that, in 2005, two large interdealer brokerage (IDB)
firms dominate the overall secondary market:
ICAP PLC, with a 60 percent market share, and
Cantor Fitzgerald, with 28 percent. Both of these
firms trade a large array of fixed-income financial
instruments, including swaps, and mortgage-
backed and agency securities, using both elec-
tronic and voice-brokered systems. We describe
these two firms and their purely electronic
Treasury platforms in greater detail in the next sec-
tion. Tullett Prebon,6 with 9 percent, and Hilliard
Farber & Co., with 3 percent, complete the second-
ary Treasury market.
On- and off-the-run markets differ by volume
and trading methods. We turn first to the more
liquid on-the-run market.
On-the-Run. There is much more secondary
volume in on-the-run securities than off-the-run
securities, with the former representing 70 per-
cent of all trading volume (Fabozzi and Fleming,
2005). Because of this liquidity difference, off-
the-run securities trade at a higher yield (lower
price) than on-the-run securities of similar matu-
rity. The amount by which the off-the-run yield
exceeds the on-the-run yield is known as the
Mizrach and Neely











Secondary Government Bond Market,
2005 Market Share
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York primary dealer
data, ICAP 2005 Annual Report, eSpeed Quarterly Report, and
market estimates from www.espeed.com and www.cstplc.com
(Tullett Prebon).
5 Mizrach and Neely (2005) explore a related concept known as
information share. This is a statistical measure of where (in which
market) price discovery takes place. From 1995 to 1999, we found







ECN Trading of On-the-Run Treasury
Securities, 2005:Q3 Market Share 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York primary dealer
data, eSpeed and ICAP 2005 financials, and author’s estimates.
6 Collins Stewart Tullett PLC is an agglomeration of a number of
prior firms: (i) Collins Stewart Ltd. was a London-based financial
services firm founded in 1991; (ii) Tullett & Riley was founded in
1971, originally focusing on foreign exchange; (iii) Tokyo Forex
took a stake in Tullett in 1986, creating Tullett & Tokyo; (iv) in 2000,
Tullett & Tokyo merged with Liberty Brokerage to create Tullett &
Tokyo Liberty; (v) Prebon was formed in 1990 following the merger
of three leading London-based money broking businesses, Babcock
& Brown, Kirkland-Whittaker, and Fulton Prebon; (vi) Prebon’s
close business alliance with the Tokyo-based Yamane Tanshi pro-
vided its current title of Prebon Yamane. Collins Stewart acquired
Tullett in March 2003 and Prebon in October 2004. The firm’s IDB
business uses the name Tullett Prebon.liquidity premium. Trading of benchmark (on-
the-run) issues is commoditized, and nearly all
of it has migrated to the electronic networks.7
Figure 2 shows market share estimates for
the ECN portion of the on-the-run market in the
third quarter of 2005.8 We estimate that on-the-run
trading for this quarter was $21.19 trillion.9 In
their financial filings, eSpeed reports transactions
volumes of $8.014 trillion during the quarter. We
then estimate BrokerTec ECN volume of $12.29
trillion.10 These figures imply on-the-run ECN
market shares, 61 percent for BrokerTec and 39
percent for eSpeed, as reported in Figure 2, which
are consistent with industry estimates for that
time (Kutler, 2006). eSpeed reports that it has
gained market share since the third quarter of
2005, however.11
We now turn to the more numerous but less
actively traded off-the-run issues.
Off-the-Run. Off-the-run securities require
more customization—that is, negotiation over
quantities and settlement details—and thus
benefit from human brokers. Although assets
themselves don’t change when they go off-the-
run, they do become more heterogeneous with
respect to depth, the quantity the dealer is will-
ing to sell at the bid or offer. Therefore they
require more negotiation in trading. Barclay,
Hendershott, and Kotz (2006) report that trans-
action volume falls by more than 90 percent, on
average, once a bond goes off-the-run. There is
a large number of issues—99 notes and 43 bonds
as of February 2006—but, with each being rela-
tively illiquid, most off-the-run trading occurs
in traditional voice networks.  
ESpeed does not compete with BrokerTec in
off-the-run trading, but the voice-assisted part
of Cantor Fitzgerald does compete with ICAP.
Because neither firm breaks out their off-the-run
voice-assisted trading from their overall figures,
we cannot estimate a market share for off-the-run
trading.
THE GROWTH OF ELECTRONIC
TRADING
Compared with equity or foreign exchange
markets, bond markets were slower to adopt
electronic trading. The bond market is large and
decentralized, such as the NASDAQ equity market
or foreign exchange market, but has more varied
assets—many types of bonds, maturities, coupons,
strips, etc. Two boxed inserts in this article
describe the growth of electronic trading in equity
and foreign exchange markets. The greater com-
plexity of trading in sundry instruments, each of
which has less liquidity than large capitalization
stocks or the major currencies, retarded the tran-
sition to electronic trading.
Electronic communications can play different
roles in the trading process. For more than a
decade, bond trading screens have displayed
quotes from dealers that helped to initiate voice
transactions. This section focuses on the com-
pletely electronic trading through ECNs. These
ECNs permit dealers to post transactable prices
and quantities and execute trades electronically.
Cantor Fitzgerald introduced the first ECN in
bond markets, eSpeed, in 1999. A consortium of
Wall Street firms, including Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs, launched a competitor, BrokerTec,
the same year. BrokerTec began commercial oper-
ations in 2000. ICAP PLC, a global, London-based
IDB, acquired BrokerTec in April 2003. On-the-
run trading is now almost completely electronic,
with the market split roughly 60-40 between the
two ECNs, as Figure 2 illustrates. While these
ECNs (eSpeed and BrokerTec) have captured most
bond market trading activity, voice brokerage
systems are used for trading in less liquid assets
or more complex deals.
Mizrach and Neely
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7 Commoditized securities are those that are undifferentiated and
liquid and trade only on price. See the glossary for further 
definitions.
8 Electronic trading in fixed income refers to both electronically
brokered, voice-assisted transactions and pure ECN trades. We
focus only on the latter here.
9 Total Treasury market trading volume averaged $473 billion per
day or $30.27 trillion for the whole quarter. Assuming 70 percent
was on-the-run, we arrive at the $21.19 trillion estimate.
10 ICAP’s BrokerTec reports a 58 percent overall secondary market
share in their filings, and we assume the same market share in the
on-the-run portion.
11 Cantor Fitzgerald reported a market share gain since 2005:Q3 in a
personal communication. History of Cantor Fitzgerald
Bernie Cantor and John Fitzgerald founded
the firm of Cantor Fitzgerald in 1945 to provide
investment advice to wealthy individuals. Cantor
Fitzgerald rose to prominence as a Wall Street
bond market broker. Cantor’s fortunes rose in 1972,
when it bought a controlling interest in Telerate
and began to post bond prices for its bond dealer
clients through the Telerate computer network.
Customers purchased the data streams and natu-
rally directed business toward its source, Cantor.
The strategy was so successful in generating trad-
ing volume that Cantor gained a “nearly monop-
olistic” bond market share (Zuckerman, Davis,
and McGee, 2001).12 Rising federal government
budget deficits in the 1980s aided Cantor’s fortunes
by greatly expanding the bond market. By the early
1990s, Cantor Fitzgerald had 20 to 25 percent of
the IDB market (SEC, 1992).
In 1991, demands by the SEC and bond market
dealers for greater transparency led to the forma-
tion of GovPX, a joint venture among five IDBs.13
Cantor was the only IDB that did not participate
in GovPX. GovPX was established to provide real-
time interdealer trade prices and volume for U.S.
Treasury bonds. The information is made publicly
available, distributed through the Internet and
data vendors.
As electronic trading became commonplace
in the equity and foreign exchange markets, Cantor
followed suit by starting the first electronic bro-
kerage system for bonds, eSpeed, in March 1999.
Cantor subsequently spun off eSpeed in a
December 1999 public offering, but retains a
controlling interest. ESpeed Inc. is listed on the
NASDAQ and trades under the symbol ESPD.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
struck Cantor particularly hard, destroying its
offices in the World Trade Center and killing 658
employees. Despite this tragedy, eSpeed became
one of the two dominant trading platforms in the
IDB market for U.S. Treasuries.
ICAP and BrokerTec
Cantor was not alone in seeing the potential
of an electronic IDB bond-trading system. In 1999,
several other Wall Street firms, including Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter & Co. and Goldman Sachs
Inc., founded BrokerTec Global LLC. ICAP is the
product of a merger between Garban PLC and
Intercapital PLC in September 1999; originally
called Garban-Intercapital, the name was changed
to ICAP in July 2001. ICAP is currently the world’s
largest IDB with revenues of £794 million, and
operating profits of £122.7 million. The company
trades publicly on the London Stock Exchange
under the symbol IAP.
In February 2000, Garban-Intercapital
launched the Electronic Trading Community
(ETC), a hybrid voice/electronic brokering system
for the Treasury market. They eventually struck
alliances with Tullett & Tokyo Liberty in November
2000 and SunGard in September 2001.
ICAP realized that it needed to grow its ECN
business and bought BrokerTec’s Treasury plat-
form in April 2003 for $185.9 million. The U.S.
Department of Justice approved the purchase
after restructuring commission agreements
between the pre-merger entities (Department of
Justice, 2003). ICAP has used the BrokerTec
platform to form partnerships similar to the one
with MarketAxess in March 2004 (Wall Street &
Technology, 2004). ICAP also acquired the data
provider GovPX Inc., in January 2005.
Recent Competition
ESpeed briefly had a dominant 70 percent
share in on-the-run trading, but BrokerTec gained
market share with lower transactions costs. Cantor
Fitzgerald filed a lawsuit alleging patent infringe-
ment on eSpeed’s trading systems. The case, filed
in January 2003, was dismissed in February 2005
by a Delaware court.
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12 Rust and Hall (2003) present a model to explain the differences in
microstructure between markets. They motivate their paper by
observing that Cantor Fitzgerald has been a successful market
maker in the U.S. Treasury bond market, but such an outcome—
a single market maker—has not emerged in the market for steel.
13 The original IDBs reporting to GovPX were Garvin Guy Butler,
Liberty Brokerage, Hilliard Farber, RMJ, and Tullet & Tokyo
Securities. As the structure of the market changed, so did the
brokers reporting to GovPX. Fleming (2003), which examines
the period 1997-2000, listed GovPX coverage as including Garban-
Intercapital, Hilliard Farber, and Tullett & Tokyo Liberty. After
ICAP’s purchase of GovPX in January 2005, ICAP PLC was the
only broker reporting through GovPX.Mizrach and Neely
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ELECTRONIC TRADING IN EQUITY MARKETS
The equity markets were the first to embrace electronic trading. Over-the-counter stocks have
traded electronically at least since the creation of the National Association of Security Dealers
(NASD) automated quote (NASDAQ) system in 1971. NASDAQ was a dealer market without a
central trading floor. It was a distant second competitor to the floor-based New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE).
The Philadelphia Stock Exchange was one of the first floor exchanges in the United States to
introduce electronic trading with the PACE (Philadelphia Automated Communication and
Execution) System in 1975. PACE permitted two-party trading from anywhere in the world but
allowed for only limited information flow. Purely electronic limit order books began with Instinet
in 1979. Instinet provided interdealer equity trading in both NYSE and NASDAQ securities.1
Despite the early adoption of this technology, U.S. equity markets tended to lag behind foreign
markets in establishing electronic markets. ECNs were created in Toronto in 1977, Tokyo in 1982,
Paris in 1986, Australia in 1990, Germany in 1991, Israel in 1991, Mexico in 1993, and Switzerland
in 1995 (Economides and Schwartz, 1995).
The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) moved the equity futures and options markets significantly
toward electronic trading with the successful introduction of GLOBEX, in 1994. The CBOT followed
this effort with GLOBEX2, in 1998, which permitted round-the-clock trading.
Christie and Schultz (1994) triggered a watershed in electronic trading by finding NASDAQ
market makers to be colluding over spreads. Following this discovery, in 1997, the SEC allowed
electronic communication networks (ECNs) or alternative trading systems (ATS) to compete with
NASDAQ dealers on an equal footing. This legal deregulation sparked a surge in electronic trading
in U.S. equity markets. However, in moving to electronic trading through independent ECNs, the
U.S. equity markets have differed from those in the rest of the world, where existing exchanges
have largely developed electronic trading.
By 2004, ECNs had grabbed a dominant market share of equity trading. In 2005, both NASDAQ
and the NYSE initiated mergers with their major electronic competitors. NASDAQ completed its
merger with Instinet in 2005 and the NYSE with Archipelago in March 2006. Even with major
changes and new electronic competition, the market has reorganized as a duopoly.
Although NASDAQ dealers held only a 35 percent market share in October 2005, this figure
understates the market power of the for-profit NASDAQ. The combined market share of NASDAQ’s
own anonymous trading facility SIZE, and the Brut and Instinet ECNs that NASDAQ has acquired,
gives this ECN more than three-quarters of the market (Mizrach, 2005).
Going forward, it appears that a hybrid market model with floor-based, open-outcry trading
will co-exist with electronic trading both through limit order books and the NASDAQ dealer
structure. Both NASDAQ and NYSE are now able to trade securities listed on the rival exchange.
In August 2006, NASDAQ handled 12.5 percent of the volume in NYSE-listed securities, while
the NYSE processed 21.3 percent of the trading in NASDAQ listings.
1 A limit order is a request to buy or sell a security at a specific price. Market orders are buy/sell orders that are to be executed imme-
diately, at current market prices.Mizrach and Neely
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2006 533











ECN Share in Over-the-Counter Equities
NOTE: Brut is the Brass Utility ECN, ArcaEX is the Archipelago ECN, INET is Instinet, and SIZE is the NASDAQ anonymous
trading facility. All other NASDAQ market markers are grouped into the NASDAQ 35 percent share. NASDAQ acquired BRUT
in September 2004 and Instinet in December 2005.
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B. ECN’s Share of Trading Volume in NASDAQ-Listed Shares
NOTE: The figure shows the growth of ECN trading since they entered the NASDAQ quote display in 1996.
SOURCE: Smith (2002), Merrill Lynch, Bloomberg, Instinet, Archipelago, and NASDAQ.
A. Trading Volume of NASDAQ-Listed SharesMizrach and Neely
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ELECTRONIC TRADING IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS
The foreign exchange market is made up of customers, dealers, and IDBs. Customers are firms
or individuals who buy or sell foreign exchange to hedge risk associated with business activities
or balance sheet exposure, to manage investment portfolios, or to import/export goods and services.
Hedge funds and pension funds, for example, frequently use the foreign exchange market to improve
their investment performance. Corporations might buy foreign exchange to purchase needed
intermediate goods from foreign suppliers. Dealers, who typically work for banks, stand ready to
“make a market”—that is, to quote prices at which they are ready to buy or sell foreign exchange.
Dealers wish to profit from the spread between the prices at which they buy and sell, as well as
to take calculated intraday positions in currencies to profit from short-term expected changes in
exchange rates. Dealers carefully manage their currency positions—especially overnight—to reduce
their exposure to adverse exchange rate movements. Therefore, most trading in the foreign exchange
market is between dealers who are seeking to manage their currency exposure. Interdealer brokers
exist to facilitate this trading by matching buyers and sellers of foreign exchange. They do not take
positions of their own.
Until the early 1990s, all foreign exchange trading was conducted via telephone. Reuters
introduced the Reuters Market Data Service (RMDS) in February 1981, which permitted the
exchange of information over computer screens, but did not allow actual trading. Reuters Dealing
2000-1 replaced RMDS in 1989. The new system facilitated direct trading that used to take place
over the telephone (Rime, 2003).
Reuters continued to lead electronic trading in foreign exchange when it launched Dealing
2000-2 (D2000-2) in 1992. This network brokered trades between ex ante anonymous parties.
Competitors soon followed, however. Minex launched an automated trading system in April 1993
and a consortium of large banks—ABN-AMRO, Bank of America, Barclays, Chemical, Citibank,
Citicorp, Commerzbank, Credit Suisse, Lehman Brothers, Midland, J.P. Morgan, NatWest, Swiss
Bankcorp, and Union Bank of Switzerland—followed suit by creating Electronic Broking Service
(EBS) in April 1993, which later bought out Minex in 1996 (Chaboud and Weinberg, 2002).
For the first few years of their existence, the electronic trading systems’ (ETS) share of foreign
exchange trading grew slowly. But the figure shows that electronic trading was clearly the domi-
nant method of operation in the interdealer market by the late 1990s. Chaboud and Weinberg (2002)
estimate the share of interdealer trading volume executed through electronic platforms to be over
60 percent by 2001. Voice trading remained important for customers and for less-liquid currencies.
This is consistent with the general observation that electronic trading has its greatest advantages
in the most liquid markets for homogenous assets.
Reuters and EBS remain the principal ETSs in the interdealer foreign exchange market as of
early 2006. The latest incarnation of the Reuters network is called D3000. EBS has the foremost
market share in trading in the two largest currency pairs, the euro-dollar and dollar-yen, while
Reuters has a leading share in British pound currency pairs and the major market shares in a
broader selection of exchange rates, including emerging market rates.Mizrach and Neely
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ELECTRONIC TRADING IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS, cont’d
In recent years, the already large foreign exchange market has continued to grow. The Bank
for International Settlements reports that foreign exchange trading volume grew by 36 percent,
from 2001 to 2004 (BIS, 2005). Some of this growth has occurred on exchanges such as the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, which currently handles only a very small proportion of the foreign
exchange market. In the midst of this expansion, the dealer market has consolidated; more trad-
ing is done by fewer and larger banks.
These large banks have their own (bank-specific) electronic trading platforms that allow direct
bank-customer trading. The three banks with the highest volumes are Deutsche Bank, UBS, and
Barclays, according to Kimbell, Newby, and Skalinder (2005). But there are now a number of smaller
electronic networks that facilitate transactions between customers and dealers (e.g., FX All, FX
Connect, and Currenex) and between customers without dealers (e.g., OANDA, HotSpot FX, IG
Markets, FXDealerDirect, DealStation, ChoiceFX, Deal4Free Forex, GFT’s DealbookFX, GCI, IFX
Markets, and Grain Capital). These ECNs enable non-bank actors—such as hedge funds—to trade










1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
Figure B2
Electronic Trading in Foreign Exchange Markets
Market Share of ECNs in Foreign Exchange Market Transactions
NOTE: Precise estimates of electronic foreign exchange broking systems’ market share are difficult to come by because of
the foreign exchange market’s decentralized nature. The BIS (2004) estimates the 2004 number and states that the share
increased slightly in that year by an unspecified amount.
SOURCE: Estimates for 1989-2001 are from Chaboud and Weinberg (2002). The BIS provides the 2004 number.Transactions costs have fallen dramatically
over the past decade. Fleming (1997) reports fees
paid by the trade initiator of $39 per $1 million
of bonds in the voice-brokered GovPX markets.
By 2005, these fees had fallen by more than 90 per-
cent to $2.50 on eSpeed and $2.00 on BrokerTec
for the best customers (Kruger, 2005).
ESpeed’s price improvement facility, a tool
that allowed traders to offer prices between the
quotes, reportedly also hurt them in the market-
place (Computer Business Review, 2005). The
price improvement system proved complex and
unpopular with customers. Quantity, rather than
price negotiation, had been standard in the indus-
try in the days of voice brokerage, and eSpeed
eliminated the price-improvement tool in January
2005. These changes seem to have stabilized a
duopoly in ECN on-the-run trading with the
market split 60-40 between BrokerTec and
eSpeed, respectively.
DATA SOURCES AND ANALYSIS
To study trading activity, spreads, and price
impact, we rely on two publicly available histori-
cal transactions databases. The first is GovPX,
which consolidated voice-brokered interdealer
quotes and trades from Garban-Intercapital,
Hilliard Farber, and Tullett & Tokyo Liberty dur-
ing our sample period of 1999. Fleming (2003)
describes the characteristics of liquidity in this
market in the period from 1997 to 2000. Our
second source is the eSpeed ECN, which recently
began to offer a transactions database.
Both the GovPX and eSpeed data sets have
their limitations. GovPX does not provide a reli-
able indicator of transactions after March 2001.
The market share of voice-brokered trading has
also substantially diminished since 1999. The
eSpeed data set is from 2004, contains only on-
the-run securities, and includes transactions but
no quotes.
Trading Activity
Trading volume continues to grow in the
government bond market much faster than the
supply of Treasuries. The marketable federal debt
held by the public grew from $3.64 trillion in fis-
cal year 1999 to $4.31 trillion in fiscal year 2004.14
Figure 3 shows the average daily trading volume
in Treasuries from 1994 to 2005. Since its 1999
nadir of under $200 billion per day, the average
volume of such transactions by primary dealers
has almost tripled to nearly $575 billion.
GovPX trading volume declined markedly
after 1999 as ECNs, such as eSpeed and BrokerTec,
began to attract business. Because the GovPX trade
volume data become very thin after 1999, this
paper will contrast GovPX data from 1999–the
last year in which voice-brokered trading pre-
dominated—with eSpeed data from 2004. 
While we omit the exact figures to protect
confidentiality, the data show a dramatic increase
in trading volume between 1999 and 2004, which
dwarfs the tripling of the government bond market
over the same period. It seems likely that the lower
cost of trading through ECNs has facilitated much
higher turnover, attracting new participants to the
Treasury market. More than 50 percent of bids and
offers on BrokerTec are now from algorithmic
trading firms (Safarik, 2005) rather than the pri-
mary dealers.
Spreads
A standard measure of liquidity is the bid/ask
spread. Dealers in the Treasury market post quotes,
along with depth, to both buy and sell Treasuries.
A combination of inventory and adverse selection
costs explains the existence of spreads in the
interdealer market. The inventory component is
the cost of keeping a ready supply of securities
for sale. The adverse selection component is due
to the risk that the dealer’s counterparty has pri-
vate information about future price changes,
which could lead to losses for the dealer. Adverse
selection is less of a problem in the Treasury mar-
ket (which is driven by publicly available infor-
mation) than in equity markets (in which private
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14 The debt figures are available at www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd/
opdpdodt.htm. Ironically, market participants and the Federal
Reserve were concerned about running out of Treasuries just a
few years ago when federal budget surpluses were growing. Alan
Greenspan (2001) testified in January 2001: “At zero debt, the
continuing unified budget surpluses currently projected imply a
major accumulation of private assets by the federal government.”information is more important). We measure this
markup for the GovPX data in 1999 and the
eSpeed data in 2004.
The most basic measure of the bid/ask spread
is the quoted spread. The quoted spread is the
gap between lowest ask price, p
a
t, and the highest
bid, p
b
t.15 It is computed in percentage terms to
compare spreads across securities and over time:
(1)                     
Unfortunately, the eSpeed database does not
include posted bid and ask prices, and we must
compute an alternative measure based on 
transactions.
A commonly used procedure, first proposed
by Thompson and Waller (1988), is to measure
the spread for day t with the mean absolute change













(2)                  
where T
+ is the number of transactions in which
the price changes on day t. The correlation
between quoted spreads and the transactions
measure is 0.99 in the GovPX data.
Table 1 summarizes the differences in
Thompson and Waller (1988) bid-ask spreads as
on-the-run trading moved to ECNs.
The GovPX voice market spreads average
0.8344 basis points for the 2-year note in 1999,
compared with 0.2053 for the eSpeed ECN quotes
in 2004, a reduction of 75 percent. The reduction
is similar for other maturities: 0.8834 basis points
in the 5-year, or 76 percent; 1.7167 basis points
in the 10-year, or 82 percent; and, finally, 4.2622
basis points in the 30-year, or 78 percent. These
substantial declines are statistically and economi-
cally significant.
MARKET IMPACT
A purchase or a sale of an asset might influ-
ence prices either through inventory effects or by
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Figure 3
Average Daily Treasury Volume
NOTE: The figure displays average daily volume of U.S. Treasury securities primary dealer transactions, by year.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York primary dealer data.
15 Many transactions take place within the quoted spread, though.
GovPX provides a workup facility to increase the transaction size
but not change the price. Until January 2005, the eSpeed network
provided an explicit mechanism for trading between the bid and
ask, a process known as price improvement.revealing private information about fundamentals
to other market participants. One would like to
know how much trades impact prices. Price
impact increases the cost of large trades, and such
costs are often larger than brokerage commissions
and spreads. This section examines the interaction
between trades and quotes using the vector auto-
regressive (VAR) system methods that Hasbrouck
(1991) introduced.
Hasbrouck proposed to study intraday price
formation with a standard bivariate VAR model.
Time t here is measured in 1-minute intervals.
Let rt be the percentage change in the transaction
price. x
0
t is the sum of signed trade indicators (+1
for buyer initiated, –1 for seller initiated) over
minute t. Fortunately, both data sets directly indi-
cate trade initiation as a “hit” –1 or a “take” +1.16
The bivariate VAR assumes that causality
flows from trade initiation to returns by permit-
ting rt to depend on the contemporaneous value
for x
0
t, but not allowing x
0
t to depend  on contem-
poraneous rt. The quote revision model is specified
as follows:
(3)       
(4)     
We estimate two versions of the VAR model
for each instrument: One version uses GovPX
data from 8:20 to 15:00 each day in January 1999,
and the other version uses similar eSpeed data
from January 2004. The original number of obser-
vations varied from instrument to instrument
before aggregating to one-minute frequency. For
example there were 17,127, 62,175, 75,791, and
19,706 observations for the 2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year
bonds for the Cantor data. After aggregating to
one-minute returns there were 8,000 observations
for the 20 trading days in the Cantor data and 7,600
observations for the 19 trading days in the GovPX
data. To allow comparison with other more-recent
market impact studies, such as Cohen and Shin
(2003), we include 15 lags of the signed trades.17
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Table 1
Spreads in the Voice and ECN Markets
GovPX eSpeed ∆ Spread Percent change
2-year 0.8344 0.2053 –0.6291 –75
5-year 1.1572 0.2738 –0.8834 –76
10-year 2.0986 0.3819 –1.7167 –82
30-year 5.4484 1.1862 –4.2622 –78
NOTE: The GovPX estimates are from 1999, and the eSpeed estimates are from 2004. The spread units are in basis points (hundredths
of a percent).
16 In microstructure databases, this inference is usually determined
by distance from the quote midpoint.
17 Given the potentially unusual distribution of the order flow vari-
able, xt
0, we considered nonlinear specifications—products of leads
and lags—but they do not enter the VAR significantly or change
substantially the market impact estimates. There does not appear
to be any significant nonlinearity in the dependent variable.
Table 2







NOTE: These are the 15-minute cumulative market impact
effects for the January 1999 GovPX database and for the
January 2004 eSpeed transactions based on the VAR analysis
shown by equations (3) and (4). The units are in basis points
(hundredths of a percent).Our estimates show that trade indicators are
positively autocorrelated and highly predictable.
In other words, buyer- (seller-) initiated trades
reliably tend to follow buyer- (seller-) initiated
trades. As one might expect from simple versions
of the efficient markets hypothesis, returns are
not very predictable, except through contempo-
raneous orders. That is, net buyer- (seller-) initiated
trades are associated with contemporaneous price
increases (decreases).
The market impact of the trade can be meas-
ured by the dynamic effect on subsequent trade
prices. The impact grows over time, generally
stabilizing after about 15 minutes. We report 15-
minute impact estimates in Table 2 for the 2-, 5-,
10-, and 30-year bonds. GovPX estimates for
January 1999 are reported in the first column, and
eSpeed estimates for January 2004 are reported in
the second column. The coefficients are in basis
points (hundredths of a percent).
The smallest GovPX market impact is for the
2-year note. Nonetheless, a one-unit ($1 million)
buy order still moves trade prices by 0.4235 basis
points, nearly double the eSpeed impact for the
same issue. The relative market impact is inversely
related to the relative volumes of the two markets.
For the other issues, the GovPX market impact is
five to eight times as large, with the latter figure
for the illiquid 30-year Treasury. On average, the
eSpeed market impact is 73.6 percent lower than
that of GovPX.
We believe that market impact is the most
comprehensive measure of market quality, reflect-
ing spreads, depths, and trading volume. The
eSpeed ECN seems to illustrate that electronic
trading in the secondary Treasury market benefits
market participants by reducing spreads and
transactions costs.
CONCLUSION
This article has reviewed the growth of ECNs
in equity, foreign exchange, and the U.S. Treasury
markets. The growth of such ECNs has enabled
firms and individuals to trade and rebalance their
portfolios at much lower cost, thereby enabling
them to reduce the risk to which they are exposed.
In particular, this article has examined the growth
of electronic competition in the secondary market
for U.S. Treasury bonds. The eSpeed and
BrokerTec ECNs have captured virtually the entire
market for the on-the-run Treasuries. This paper
has studied transactions from eSpeed for 2004, a
data set that has not yet been explored in the lit-
erature, and documented improvements over the
earlier voice-assisted technology. The eSpeed ECN
has greater volume, smaller spreads, and a lower
estimated impact of a trade. Lower spreads can
benefit smaller traders by lowering their costs of
portfolio rebalancing. A smaller market impact
ensures that institutional investors get similar
benefits.
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GLOSSARY
Agency securities are issued by institutions established by the U.S. government, such as the Student
Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae). Such institutions were created to lower borrowing costs
in favored sectors of the economy.
Algorithmic trading is the practice of automatically transacting based on a quantitative model.
A broker is a firm that matches buyers and sellers in financial transactions. Brokerage firms in bond
markets do not trade for their own account. An interdealer broker (IDB) is an intermediary providing
trading services to hedge funds, institutions, and other dealers. IDBs handle the majority of Treasury
securities transactions in the secondary market.
A commoditized security has been altered to increase its liquidity, making it an undifferentiated product
traded solely on price.
Depth is the quantity the dealer is willing to sell at the bid or offer.
Electronic communications networks (ECNs) are electronic trading systems that automatically match
buy and sell orders at specified prices.
A limit order is a request to buy or sell a security at a specific price. Market orders are buy/sell orders
that are to be executed immediately, at current market prices.
A mortgage-backed security is a bond whose payoff is backed by the payments on a pool of mortgages,
such as those issued by Freddie Mac.
On-the-run refers to the most recently auctioned Treasury security of a particular maturity. After the
next auction, the other bonds go off-the-run.
The quoted spread is the gap between lowest ask price and the highest bid.
Trading in on-the-run and off-the-run securities makes up the secondary Treasury market.
Strips are portions of securities that have been separated into different assets. U.S. Treasury bonds, for
example, are often split into principal and interest components and each can be separately owned.
Such division permits the construction of zero-coupon bonds. STRIPS stands for “Separate Trading
of Registered Interest and Principal Securities.”  
Parties to an interest rate swap exchange interest payments on a notional principal amount. Typically,
one party pays a fixed interest rate, while the other party pays a floating rate.
When-issued bonds are those Treasuries whose auctions have been announced but that have not yet
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